Understanding Chinese Engagement In Latin America Power Point Project

R. Evan Ellis
U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute

Westminster Institute
McLean, VA

February 20, 2023

sa ARA, -

Structure of PRC Advance in LAC

u> oF /
AR cou

$171.8B investment in 480 projects Caribbean as Strategic?
* 130% in ’21 in Brazil?

$138B* loans since ’05 (weak in ‘27)

$314B bilateral trade ‘21

Bilateral:

Strategic Partners
(10) w Committees, ©

FTAs (e.g. EC, UY) & Military, Police

nnectit Activities

Multilateral: China-CELAC 8 | (Knowledge,

(look at '22-'24 plan), ECLAC, Activities Relations to
IADB, CDB, BRICS... operate in region)
PRC-CELAC Forums: DisaSte?” Ee
Relief, 5“ Defense Forum
Dr. R. Evan Ellis —Tel/WhatsApp: +17033287770 Email: r om Website: revanellis.com

PRC “Strategic Risks” in LAC (a)

* Leverage from “soft power”: PRC as importer, investor, local partner
* “Counter-model” of non-democratic success, order?
“People power”
* Confucius Institutes (44) + Hanban: co-opt China-facing elites
* Academics & consultants (attraction: trips to PRC, access)
* CCP International Liaison Department: United Front work
* PRC “police stations’: Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Panama Peru
* Digital>Espionage (Pol+ Mil+ Commercial): J Partner Sovereignty
* Telecom: Huawei 5G, “smart/safe cities”: 10+ countries incl Suriname
* Ecommerce/Finance (Didi, Alibaba, Fosun, Fintech [e.g. NuBank])
* Data centers Huawei (MX,CHI,ARG,BRA,PER), Tencent (BRA);
Asino mgt of Chile Civil registry ($205M), NuTech
* Incubator/maintainer of authoritarian regimes>Reinforcing Cycle?
* Incubation: loans + commodity purchases (“China gets paid”)
* Security support (e.g. Ven Armored vehicles)
* Support to authoritarian “digital control”:
* BOL-110, ECU-911, Fatherland ID card, Cuba ETECSA

Dr. R. Evan Ellis —Tel/WhatsApp: +17033287770 Email: r_ evan ellis@hotmail.ccom Website: revanellis.com

Wartime: PLA Leverage, Knowledge, Access

°* Political/Economic NS. ze a cal

leverage: Multinational, ty, to
coalition support; Base Ch nt
access, airspace, ee ie
waterway use catimans | oe Some

Osea
MN felicaragua

¢ PLA intel, SpecOps in = a
region: = ia
* Homeland at risk, ea
deployment and i:
sustainment flows to A to aa
PACOM, PY ae,
chokepoints, be %
diversionary crises &
(Econ, Ag)
* PLA access to WHEM
ports, Space, other
strategic infrastructure i
Dr. R. Evan Ellis Tel/WhatsApp: +17033287770 Email: r_evan_ellis@hotmail.com Website: revanellis.com

PRC-LAC o

2 ey
1 CO

* VEN>SALBA>other (ARG JF-17, Peru
* + offer ( TTO, UY, to AR)
(busses/4x4s, tractors, police cars, incl
* — Including (GPF, TTPS, DR, CR, NI)

»" NDU 2PLA >PLA
. : Manaus, CCOPAB, Tolemaida
> >
2015, > Ex. w Chile (Dec ‘13)
port calls since ‘09

" Role in Argentine
Dr. R. Evan Ellis —Tel/WhatsApp: +17033287770 Email: r_ evan ellis@hotmail.com Website: revanellis.com

PRC Space Activities in LAC Oo

° Brazil:

¢* 5 (CBERS) (last in Dec ‘19) / 1 failure?

* Alcantara launch facility if PT returns Oct ‘22?
Venezuela:

* 3 (Venesat-1, VRSS, VRSS 2 [Oct 2017])

° Infra: BAMARI (Guarico), Luepa (SE Bolivar)

Bolivia:

* Tupac Katari (Dec 2013), Bartolina Sisa?

* Infra: Amachuma (La Paz), La Guardia (Sta Cruz) ,
Argentina: a.

* Neuqueén radar, polar? San Juan Obs., Nusat

* Chile: Paranal observatory
* Peru (APSCO, satellite sharing)

China-CELAC Space Cooperation Forum?
LAC on PRC Lunar Research Station?

PRC support to LAC Space Agency (ALCE)?

Dr. R. Evan Ellis Tel/WhatsApp: +17033287770 Email: r evan ellis@hotmail.com Website: revanellis.com

COVID-19: PRC Advance w. ¢ Tensions 6

* Medical sales + Vax leverage, co-production (PRC-CELAC ’22-’24 plan)
* PRC vaccs low efficacy + Western vaccs
* But new PRC bid for biotech presence in region (e.g. COL, PER, ARG)?

* t+ Trade (if PRC growth): Brazil (soy), Ecuador (shrimp), El Salvador (sugar)

* Loans and projects for LAC governments in fiscal/economic distress
* 4 Opportunities with current populist/leftist wave (Tdisposition, tneed)?

* 1 presence from M&A of Western Co. assets in LAC [like 2010, but more]

* Taiwan: tT PRC push w PRC-US conflict over Taiwan [Pelosi, other CODELS]?
* Advance through MOUs opening up market, buying off elites via visit
* Nicaragua>Paraguay (‘23 elections), Honduras, Haiti, St. Lucia?

* t PRC Challenges (LAC w higher desperation, crime, social mobilization)

* Nearterm restraints to PRC dissipating in ’23?
* Covid lockdowns/protest controls lifted, PRC low growth (3.1% ‘22-'23),
debt overhang (e.g. Evergrande), tech control (e.g. x Jack Ma)
* SAL, Diaz-Canel, Boric, Lula, Santoki? visits to PRC; Xi>LAC in ‘23?
Dr. R. Evan Ellis Tel/(WhatsApp: +17033287770 Email: r evan ellis@hotmail.com Website: revanellis.com

For further Information,
or to be included on the mailing list for Dr.
Ellis’ publications about these topics,
please contact:

Dr. R. Evan Ellis
Tel/WhatsApp: +17033287770

Email: r_evan_ellis@hotmail.com

Website: revanellis.com